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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REGIONAL
ORGANIZATION INTERVENTION IN CIVIL
WARS
CHRISTOPHER J. BORGEN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations's reach in peacekeeping is fast outdistancing its grasp. Spread across seventeen countries, its over
80,000 civilian and military personnel monitor cease-fires, protect aid convoys, and separate warring parties.' As the United
Nations extends its arms, financial resources seem to slip
through its fingers like grains of sand.2 In short, the United
Nations lacks the resources to continue increasing its peacekeeping responsibilities.
In An Agenda for Peace (Agenda), Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposes that part of the solution to the economic problems of the United Nations lies in reconsidering
how regional organizations interact with the United Nations, 3
a suggestion which revisits a half century debate between advocates of globalism and advocates of regionalism. 4 This Note
examines the globalist/regionalist debate as it affects an area
of particular importance in the post-Cold War era: the international community's response to the growing number of civil
wars.
* Junior Fellow, Center for International Studies. A.B. 1991, Harvard
College; 1995 J.D. candidate, New York University School of Law. I would
like to thank Professors Thomas Franck, Gregory Fox, and Paul Szasz as well
as Ms. Shelley Fenchel of the Center for their guidance and support. Professors Georg Nolte and David Wippman and Mr. Kenning Zhang all provided
invaluable insights. The research and writing of this Note was supported by
a grant from the Ford Foundation. Special thanks to mom, dad, and Lori.
1. Report of The Secretary-G r on the Work of the Organization, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/48/1, at 59 (1993).
2. Paul Lewis, United Nations is FindingIts Plate Inreasingly Full but Its
Cupboard is Bare N.Y. TWms, Sept. 27, 1993, at A8.
3. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, U.N. Doc. A/47/277/ S/24111 (1992) [hereinafter AGENDA].
4. For a history of the globalism/regionalism debate, see E.uVARD HAt.
BRO Er AL, CHARTER OF THE UN=mD NATIoNs: Co~mETrARY AND

DoctmENTs

354 (3d ed. 1969).
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In studying this topic, parts I and II will provide brief
summaries of the legal issues relating to civil wars in general
and to issues raised by the language of the U.N. Charter itself.
By means of a case study of the European Community's
(E.C.) 5 reaction to the conflict between Croatia and Serbia,
part III will act as a counterpoint to the textual summary of the
preceding sections. It will illustrate practical considerations in
regional organization intervention. Part IV, by reincorporating the textual and historical approaches, will return to the
Charter and re-examine its text in light of the Croatian case
and other examples. Part V will consider various political and
empirical factors that affect the action of regional organizations and will suggest a series of textual and institutional
changes that can be made to invigorate cooperation between
the United Nations and regional organizations.
II.
A.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD

Writing Regional OrganizationsInto the Charterof the United
Nations

Fifty years ago, the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II was a brutal lesson in the potential shortcomings of global organizations. At the San Francisco Conference, wherein the U.N. Charter was drafted, debates concerning the relationship between global and regional
arrangements re-emerged in the international agenda.6 The
debates rang not only in San Francisco meeting rooms, but in
State Department hallways in Washington. However, it was at
the San Francisco Conference that the growing Inter-American Treaty System 7 led North and South American delegates
to discuss the issue of regional organizations. For the United
States, Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles favored the regional principle, presumably because of his concern with Latin
5. Although the E.G. is now called the European Union, this Note will
refer to it by its name at the time of the case study.
6. See generally UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE

INTERNATIONAL OR-

GANIZATION.

7. This culminated in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, and the Charter of the Organization of
American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, as amended by the 1967 Protocol of Amendment, 21 U.S.T. 607 (effective Feb. 27, 1970) [hereinafter OAS
Charter].
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American affairs, while Secretary of State Cordell Hull was an
"advocate of the global emphasis." 8 Hull did not deny that regional arrangements could exist, but believed that they
"should be subordinate to a strong centralized organization."9
This view resulted in the drafting of Chapter VIII of the U.N.
Charter.
The Charter's treatment of regional organizations is primarily contained in two sections: Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54)
and Article 51. Chapter VIII, the focus of this Note, defines
the duties and privileges of regional organizations, while Article 51 considers the special case of collective self-defense.
The most basic exposition of the role of regional arrangements takes place in Article 52. The first paragraph states that
nothing in the Charter precludes regional organizations from
addressing issues of international peace and security in matters "as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent
10
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."
Although commentators have viewed this paragraph as a
broad overview of the role of regional organizations," it puts
in place two specific criteria: regional action should be both
appropriate and consistent with the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.
While during the Cold War issues of appropriateness or
first principles may have caused deadlock in a divided Security
Council, the United Nations faces different problem in the
post-Cold War era. In particular the increasing number of
failed states and the amount of civil strife calls for a renewed
consideration of these limitations. In a world of limited resources and constant conflict, one should address the issue of
appropriateness not only by examining the U.N. Charter, but
also the charters of the regional organizations themselves and
their varied political and military capabilities. Such an interpretive strategy implies not only that every regional organization may not have the same logistical capabilities,12 but that
8. HAmBRo -r AL., supra note 4, at 354.
9. Symposium, The United Nations and the New World Order,81 GEo. LJ.

491, 515 n.132 (1993).
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
11. HAMBRO Ex Ai-, supra note 4, at 356.
12. Consider, for example, the military disparity betwveen NATO and the
Organization for African Unity.
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each may face different idiosyncratic legal barriers due to their
individual charters.' 3 Simply put, the issue of appropriateness
determines who may act under certain circumstances.
This issue is of particular importance to Article 53's stipulation that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council .... " 14 But what is an enforcement action? The term is used in numerous points
throughout the Charter: Articles 41 and 42 both make some
mention of "measures" or "action [s]" that the Security Council
may undertake to enforce compliance with its resolutions. Article 2(7) also uses the term, prohibiting U.N. intervention in
not apply to
the domestic affairs of states, even though it does
"enforcement measures under Chapter VII." 15
How should the term "enforcement action" be read when
describing the actions for which regional organizations need
13. See infrapart VI.B.1 for a discussion of the Organization of American
States.
14. Article 53, paragraph 1 states, in relevant part: "The Security Council
shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for
enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council...." U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
15. Article 41 states, in relevant part, that:
[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions
... These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.
Id art. 41.
Article 42 is applied if Article 41 measures would be "inadequate."
In such a case the Security Council "may take such action by air,
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Id. art. 42.
Article 2, paragraph 7 states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Id art. 2, para. 7.
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Security Council approval? Many of the cases considered below will turn on this definition.
Article 54 creates a similar concern, as it states that "[t ] he
Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of
activities undertaken or in contemplation" by regional organizations for the "maintenance of international peace and security. "1 6 Clearly, for the United Nations to approve or disapprove
of a regional organization intervention, it must be aware of the
issues involved.
Finally, any discussion of regional organizations must take
Article 51 into account.' 7 Participants at the San Francisco
Conference were concerned that a permanent member of the
Security Council would use its veto to prevent any military acions-defensive or otherwise-by regional arrangement.
The worry that a veto by a permanent member "might cripple
the functioning of regional arrangements finally led to a provision safeguarding the right to individual and collective self defense.""' Article 51 was written "to allow a measure of autonomy for regional and other groupings in case of an armed attack;"' 9 but it was placed in Article VII as opposed to Article
VIII to make clear that it was a right that was not only held by
regional arrangements, but by all states. Thus, the unified
concept of a regional arrangement was split as some regional
organizations attempted to define their rights not on the articles of Chapter VIII, but solely on Chapter VII's Article 51.20
16. ReLart. 54, para. 1.
17. Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Coun-

cil and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Id. art. 51, para. 1.
18. Gerhard Bebr, Regional Oiganizations: A United Nations Pblem, 49 Ast.
J. INT'L L 166, 169 (1955).
19. HAMBRO Er AT., supranote 4, at 364.

20. Bebr, supra note 18, at 169.
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While the San Francisco Conference opted for Hull's formulation, the issue is still very much a topic of debate, as ex21
emplified by the Secretary-General's An Agenda for Peace.
Rather than attempting to close the book concerning the U.N.
relationship to regional organizations, the Agenda invites the
various organizations and the United Nations to author a new
chapter in their ongoing relationship.
B.

Themes in an Evolving Relationship

Three themes dominate the discussion of the evolving
role of regional organizations in the modem world: the capability of regional organizations to undertake military action,
the expertise and possible bias that regional organizations may
have in policing local conflicts, and the oversight that the
United Nations has over any regional action. The interrelation of these themes sets forth a broader set of concerns which
will be the focus of this Note. These themes include:
1.

The Problem of Deadlock

The dilemma of deadlock arises when a regional organization wishes to undertake an enforcement action but is unable
to get Security Council approval because either:
a. The Security Council stays silent as to whether
or not a given situation is a threat to international
peace and security, or
b. Security Council members believe that any attempt officially to label the situation as such would
result in a veto.
2.

The Insufficient Means of Regional Organizations

Having insufficient means becomes problematic when a
regional organization receives U.N. approval but lacks the necessary resources to complete the task at hand. Regional organizations generally have only limited (if any) military and financial resources. Moreover, the charters of many regional
organizations forbid any involvement of the organization in
the internal affairs of a member state.
21. See generally AGENDA, supra note 3.
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The Dilemma of Economic Coercion

One possible solution to the problem of having insufficient means would be for regional organizations to refrain
from undertaking military action. Instead, they should apply
economic sanctions, a mechanism which has not been traditionally considered an "enforcement action" within the realm
of Chapter VIII jurisprudence. In today's interdependent
world, economic sanctions are increasingly lethal. However,
this raises another issue: should a body such as the Security
Council or the General Assembly be able to regulate instances
of economic coercion that reach a certain level of lethality?
4. Leadership and Hegemony
The leadership of strong states in regional organizations
has the potential of having either positive or negative effects.
How can the United Nations harness the advantages of the
leadership of regional powers without encouraging predatory
hegemony?
5.

Consultation and Bias

How can the United Nations tap the informational resources and cultural understandings of regional organizations
without succumbing to an unduly biased view of events in the
region?
6.

Theory and Practice

The issue underlying all of these dilemmas is the divergence of theory and practice. The words of Chapter VIII of
the Charter do not clearly describe how states should act.
Although it is difficult to proclaim peacekeeping efforts by regional organizations as successful, can it be said that such successes result from Chapter VIII guidelines or perhaps in spite
of them? This Note argues that the latter is the case.
The following section will begin to unpack these themes
by examining the changing definitions of certain central
terms.

I.

THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS

One of the most basic problems in discussing the norms
of multilateral intervention into civil wars is the problem of
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imprecise language. Many terms are seemingly similar-intervention and enforcement action, for example-but have differing applications in international law. A further complication is that at times the same words may have different meanings in different parts of the U.N. Charter. The term
"enforcement action," which is central to this Note's topic, is
one such term. Consequently, we will begin the inquiry into
these issues by defining the terms that are of particular importance.
A.

Civil Wars and InternationalLaw

A civil war is a "war between two or more groups of inhabitants of the same State."22 It may be fought for the control of the government, or for the secession of part of the
country, or even by two factions while the government remains
neutral. 23 States have only limited rights under international
law to intervene in civil wars to which they are not parties. The
legality of intervention in such circumstances is based on the
24
type of assistance granted to the parties.
Although civil wars have generally been considered to fall
within a state's domestic jurisdiction, they often have a serious
international impact. Many of the international wars since
1945 have had their roots in civil wars. 25 Therefore, the difficult question is to determine when these civil wars become a
threat that affects international peace and security.
More precisely, given the system of U.N. and regional organization charters and treaties, who can define a civil war as a
threat to international peace and security? This question is
the root of almost every other issue regarding the relationship
between the United Nations and regional organizations.
22. Michael B. Akehurst, Civil War, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
88 (Max Planck Institute ed., 1982).

OF

PUBLIC INTER-

NATIONAL LAW

23. Id.
24. Id. at 89. The legality of civil wars is particularly questionable when a
dependent people is forcibly prevented from expressing its right to self-determination. Id.Paragraph 4 of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, states "[a]ll armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in
order to enable them to exercise... their right to complete independence."
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 67, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1960).
25. Id.
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B. Interventions and Enforcement Actions
1.

What is an Intervention?

"Intervention" is a broad term that has been narrowed in
scope due to state practice. 26 While political scientists use the
word "intervention" to describe when one "comes between"
contending parties with the ability to impose a settlement, international lawyers apply the term to situations in which an
external power interferes unlawfully with a state's territorial integrity or political independence. 27 Despite their differences,
both definitions agree that an intervention is an act intended
to alter an existing relationship. The U.N. Charter lists two
methods by which regional organizations may justifiably intervene: through the peaceful settlement of disputes or through
enforcement (generally interpreted as military) action.2
Libraries can be filled with explications of when states
may or may not intervene on behalf of rebels, governments,
and third parties. Such a detailed summary of this realm of
jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, this
Note will explore the specific issues that regional organizations
face concerning intervention.
2.

Enforcement Actions as a Subset of Interventions

The meaning of the term "enforcement action" as used in
Chapter VIII has been a point of contention since the establishment of the United Nations. This section will attempt to
trace the evolution of the meaning of the term, as well as to
present the problems created by the use of that accepted definition in today's world.
The debates in San Francisco preceding the ratification of
the U.N. Charter strongly support "that "enforcement action'
was intended to mean any and all measures the Security Coun26. Lori Fisler Damrosch notes that the etymology of the word "intervention" is very clear, simply meaning "to come between." Lori Fisler Damrosch,
CoLLECrrvE SECURr IN INTERA Introduction to ENFORCING REmwNTw
-noNAL CoNmUars 3 (Lor Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993) (hereinafter ENFORCING RESTRAINT].

27. Id.
28. U.N. CHaR arts. 52-53.

29. For an excellent summary, see Akehurst, supra note 22. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27).
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cil was authorized to take under Articles 41 and 42." ° Thus, if
the term "enforcement action" encompassed both Articles 41
and 42, a regional organization could not pursue a policy of
coordinated economic sanctions or interrupted diplomatic relations, let alone a blockade or other military action, without
approval of the Security Council. However, practice has
evinced a much more restricted interpretation of "enforce31
ment action."
In 1960, the Organization of American States (OAS)
voted for collective economic measures against the Dominican
Republic. The Soviet Union argued in the Security Council
that such a measure requires the approval of the Council "so
as to give it legal force and render it effective."32 Others argued that the OAS action was justified by the reporting procedure of Article 54, and, since OAS states could legally undertake such sanctions individually, they should be allowed to
take them collectively. The Security Council concluded that
"[A]rticle 53 does not apply to nonmilitary measures of the
kind indicated in Article 41," 3 it only applies to Article 42 actions.
During the Punta del Este debates in 1962, the issue was
briefly revisited when Cuba asked the Security Council to request an advisory opinion from the International Court ofJustice as to whether or not the Article 53 usage of enforcement
action included Article 41 provisions. The Security Council
voted not to make the request because the question was political in nature. It had already decided that in the Cuban case
both economic measures and the exclusion from participation
34
in the OAS did not constitute an enforcement action.
30. HAMBRO ET AL., supra note 4, at 365. See also U.N. CHAmR arts. 41,
42; supra note 13;Joachim Wolf, RegionalArrangements and the U.N. Charter,in
6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289, 292 (Max Planck Institute ed., 1983).
31. HAMBRO ET AL., supra note 4, at 365.
32. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 893d mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.893 (1960),
quoted in HAmBRo ET AL., supra note 4, at 365.
33. HAMBRO ET AL., supra note 4, at 365; see also U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess.,
874th and 875th mtgs., U.N. Docs. S/PV.874 and S/PV.875 (1960) (debate
over U.S. and O.A.S. treatment of Cuba).
34. HAMBRO ET AL., supra note 4, at 366; see U.N. Doc. S/5095 Mar. 20,
1962. For the purposes of this paper, the issue is not whether the I.CJ. can
consider political questions, per se, but rather that the fact that the act of
defining "enforcement action" was considered a political, rather than inter-
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What is a Regional Organization?

In 1926 Alejandro Alvarez, who later became a judge on
the International Court of Justice, wrote that there is "no rule
to determine regions. Their existence must be shown by circumstances, and, in particular, by the agreements made by the
Regions are constituted by
States who constitute them ....
certain countries having affinities of race, institutions, or,
above all, political interests."3 5
The San Francisco Conference seems to have agreed:
"Neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council has
what confound it necessary or desirable to attempt to define
36
stitutes regional arrangements and agencies."
The task of definition is no longer purely legal, but rather
political. Inasmuch as there is no textual guide, an organization may be perceived as a regional organization based largely
on how it defines itself and on the acceptance of that definition by other U.N. member states. The OAS is one of the few
organizations that explicitly stated in its Charter that it intended to be a U.N. Charter Chapter VIII regional organization. 37 Historically, though, self-definition was an issue when
organizations such as NATO or the League of Arab States
claimed that they should not be considered Chapter VIII regional organizations, and as such were exempt from the rules
and constraints of Chapter VIII. They feared that if they called
themselves regional organizations, the Security Council would
oversee their actions, thus causing them to lose the very flexibility of action which was central in their establishment as a
regional organization.8 Consequently, regional organizations
with such concerns stated that they were established pursuant
to the right to collective self defense of Article 51.3 9
pretive, issue. This implies the possible need to hedge legal questions because of political realities.
35. "La Reforme du Pacte de la Societe de Nations Sur des Bases Continentales et Regionales" (a report to the 5th Session of the Union Juridique
Internationale, Paris, 1926) 99, quoted in E.N. van Kieffen, Regiona/im and
PolitialPacts, 43 AM.J.

INT'L

L 666, 667 (1949).

36. HAMBRO Er AL, supra note 4, at 356.
37. OAS Charter, supra note 7, art. 2; see also Bebr, supranote 18, at 176.
38. TomJ. Farer, A Paradigmof Legitimate Intervention, in ENFoRCING RE.
srRirr, supra note 26, at 316, 336.
39. Ambassador Austin, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, said, concerning NATO, "[wie are not in that objective of the
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However, the interests of these organizations are in a state
of flux. NATO now claims it is willing to work with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) on a
case by case basis, 40 and the Arab League undertook
peacekeeping activities in Lebanon in the late 1970's, 4 1 thus
bringing both organizations closer to Chapter VIII oversight.
Moreover, the European Community is asserting its ability to
handle foreign policy matters. 4 2 While there is an increase in
regional organizations paying lip service to their ability and
desire to help maintain international peace and security, there
are few cases of such organizations successfully taking on these
responsibilities. Consequently, this Note will address situations wherein regional organizations have been relatively successful in maintaining or restoring international peace. It will
also address whether such success was achieved in spite of
Chapter VIII constraints. A case of regional organization intervention will be examined first.

treaty which functions under Chapter VIII at all; are we? We are in article 51
.... " Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committe 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), quoted in Bebr, supranote 18, at 180.
Commentators analyzing the Collective Security Pact of the Arab League
have concluded that the lack of references to Article 54 "bears clear evidence of the unmistakable intention to keep the Pact exclusively within Article 51." Bebr, supra note 18, at 181; see also Wolf, supra note 30, at 289.
40. In AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREvENTrVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND
PEACEKEEPING, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, which collates the replies
of various regional organizations to the AGENDA, NATO stated:
In June 1992, the Allies stated their preparedness to support, on a
case by case basis, peace-keeping activities under the responsibility
of the Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), including by making available resources and expertise. (In December 1992], Allied Ministers stated their readiness to respond positively to initiatives that the United Nations Secretary-General might
take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of United
Nations Council resolutions.
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. S/25996, at 18 (1993)

[hereinafter REPLY].
41. Mufeed Shihab, Arab States, League of, in 6
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30 at 22.
42. REPLY, supra note 40, at 7-9.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
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CONTAINING THE APOCALYPSE: EUROPEAN CoMMnmIrY
PouLc TowARDs THE BALKAN WAR, 1991-1992

Looking back on the opening days of the Balkan breakup, one almost forgets that it was neither the United Nations
nor the United States that was called upon to stop the bloodshed, but rather the European Community. 43 The twelve
members of the Community were the first to respond to the
fighting between Serbia and Slovenia in June 1991 and between Serbia and Croatia in July and August of the same
year.4 4 On June 29, 1991, at the Luxembourg summit
designed to focus on the economic and political integration of
the twelve E.C. members, the delegates instead focused their
attention on the Balkan crisis, deciding unanimously to dispatch an immediate peace mission consisting of the foreign
ministers of Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, to the
strife-tom region.4 Since Yugoslavia was not a member of the
European Community, the European Commuity acted under
the aegis of the CSCE,a larger regional organization to which
both the E.G. states and Yugoslavia belonged.
A.

The Constraintson Regional Action

One of the key problems was that neither the E.C. or the
CSGE had the necessary tools needed to address the Balkan
situation. Although the European Community had substantial
economic muscle, it did not have any clear jurisdiction over
internal conflicts. Thus, since Yugoslavia and the break-away
republics were not Community members, the European Community did not have the necessary clout to address the problem. However, the Balkan states were members of the CSCE.
As a result, the two organizations addressed the Balkan crisis
in unison: the CSGE provided the jurisdictional framework
while the European Community provided the credible threat
of economic sanctions. In fact, E.C. leaders threatened to
sever all economic ties (worth nearly one billion U.S. dollars)
with any Yugoslav republic that did not abide by the cease43. Marc Weller, CurrentDevelopment: The InternationalResponse to the Dissolution of the Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 86 Ahf.J. ImrL L 569, 570-

581 (1992).
44. 1d. at 571, 575.
45. William Drozdiak, West Europeans Send Envoys, Debate Yugoslav Crisis,

WASH. Posr, June 29, 1991, at A18.
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fire. 4 6 Community leaders were hopeful that the threat of fall-

ing into disfavor with the E.C. would push the governments of
Yugoslavia and the republics towards a settlement of the con47
flict.

Although delegations jointly representing the European
Community and the CSCE attempted to broker a solution in
the early days of the conflict, their arranged cease-fire was "reduced to tatters" within forty-eight hours of the original agreement.48

It therefore became increasingly clear that the

CSCE's fledgling conflict mechanism was not prepared to address the deteriorating situation in the Balkans. The Community itself-rather than the joint E.C./CSCE-took center
stage as the primary international negotiator in the crisis.
The early attempts by the European Community and
CSCE at policing international peace and security were a sharp
reminder that, although regional organizations may have the
privilege to seek peaceful solutions within their regions, they
do not necessarily have the legal, political, military, or financial capabilities to do so. Constraints ranging from a charter
that does not give the right to intervene in the internal affairs
of member states to the simple lack of political, military, or
economic leverage are continously encountered by regional
organizations. 49 Beyond the legal constraints of the regional
organizations' charters, the constitutions of certain member
states may preclude military action. For example, Germany's
Basic Law has traditionally prevented its armed forces from
taking part in military activities beyond NATO boundaries. 0
46. William Drozdiak, Europeans Laud Their Efforts in Yugoslavia, WAsHl.
PosT, June 30, 1991, at A20; see also Weller, supra note 43, at 576.
47. Id.
48. EC Delegation to Visit Yugoslavia to Pave Way for Observers,REUTER LnIR.
REP., July 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lbyrpt File.
49. Regarding charter prohibitions on intervention, see Charter of the
Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 766 (entered into
force Sept. 13, 1963); Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity, 1964,July 21, 1964, 3 I.L.M. 1116; Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, 1975, May 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1200.
50. See BAsic LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY; Nomi Morris,
Debate Rages Over Germany's U.N. Role, FIN. Posr, Mar. 4, 1993, at 10. Morris's
article states that the Basic Law allows for defensive "maintenance of security." German courts have interpreted that to mean that no troops are allowed
outside of NATO boundaries. The government of Germany has tried to get a
broader interpretation of the Basic Law so that it could send troops to
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The Risk of Bias

The European Community proceded to focus on mediating an agreement between the parties. OnJuly 28, 1991, Stipe
Mesic, the Croatian chairman of Yugoslavia's joint presidency,
asked for the Community to mediate an end to the fighting.-5
Such a task required that the European Community be trusted
to some extent by all parties. But, due to Germany's historic
ties to Croatia, Germany was "unlikely to be seen by the Serbs
as a disinterested party."52 Moreover, Britain and France, with
their ties to Serbia stemming from both World Wars, were per53
ceived as favoring the maintainance of a federal Yugoslavia.
In this manner, the biases of the individual member-states and
of the European Community as a whole became an issue.
Rather than balancing out, these competing biases created
policy confusion within the Community54 and caused concern
within the Balkans.5 5 It is unclear whether or not a regional
organization can intervene effectively if it is perceived to be
biased towards one or more of the parties in a civil war.

C.

Security Council Deadlock

Another constraint that the European Community faced
concerned the possibility that the United Nations would not
get involved even when asked. There were two scenarios for
that case: either the U.N. Security Council would not act, or, if
it did act, it would not define the situation as a "threat to the
peace." Either option would preclude the European Community from undertaking an enforcement action because, should
the Security Council either remain silent regarding the
Balkans or address the situation but fall short of declaring it a
Somalia but the political opposition complained such a tactic was unfair and
only a constitutional amendment could allow for such a change.
51. Croat LeaderAsks Europe to Help Ethnic Fghting, USA TODA^, July 29,
1991, at 4A.
52. Lawrence Freedman, A Catastrophe e fMst Avoid, T EINDEDNT,
Aug. 6, 1991, at 17, availablein LEXIS, Neis Library, Indpnt File.
53. STJEPAN G. MEsmovic Er At., THE RoAD FRoh PARADISE= PROSPECTS
FOR Dm ocRAcy N EAsTERN EUROPE 32 (1993); S. Neil MacFarlane &

Thomas G. Weiss, Regional OrganizationsandRegiona ScuriV SEcuPriY STUD.,
Autumn 1992, at 6, 27-28.
54. MacFarlane & Weiss, supra note 53, at 28.
55. Freedman, supranote 52, at 17.
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threat to the peace, the Community would not have the Article
53 predicate to undertake an enforcement action.
In July 1991, the United Nations appeared to rebuke the
European Community. When the foreign ministers of Germany, Belgium, and Austria suggested the possibility of U.N.
involvement, then-Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar declined involving the Organization, stating that "[a] ny action by
the United Nations at this point would appear as a kind of
interference in European efforts." 56 Community leadership
was skeptical of the chances of U.N. military support. On August 12, Hans van den Broek, then president of the E.G. Council of Ministers, announced that "internal problems in the Soviet Union and China will prevent the Yugoslav crisis from being debated in the United Nations Security Council," which
made the European Community consider organizing an international peace conference on Yugoslavia.5 7 Moreover, van
den Broek thought that even if the U.N. Security Council did
consider the Yugoslav situation, it would find the conflict was
"not a threat to international peace," and as such would not
act. 58
D.

The Effects of Nonmilitary Options

By the time summer turned to autumn, the initial optimism was gone, but there was still a belief among Community
leaders that a solution could be found. Although military options had faded 59 and mediation was stalled, there were still
the options either of increasing the economic pressure on the
region or of formally recognizing Croatia and Slovenia. E.C.
President Jacques Delors was confident of the impact of such
steps, and stated that recognition would be "the diplomatic
equivalent of the atomic bomb," and, should the European
56. EC States ConsiderRecognition of Rebel Yugoslav Republics, REUTER
REP.,

LIBR.

July 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lbyrpt File.

57. Yugoslavia: EC Proposes International Conference, INTER

PRESS SERVICE,

Aug. 12 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
58. Id.
59. In September, the twelve foreign ministers circulated a communique
that read, in part, "The Community and its member states... [understand]
that no military intervention is contemplated. EG Rules Out Intervention in
Yugoslavia, REUrER LIER. REP., Sept. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lbyrpt File. For examples of later refusals, see Serbs Reject European
Peace Plan, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1991, at 5.
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Community break off economic relations with Serbia, "[Serbia] would not be able to survive." 60 Three months later, Germany argued that "speedy recognition" would "internationalize" the crisis and entitle an "E.C. force" to enter the Balkan
republics.6 1 Should such means used to bring about an end to
62
a conflict be viewed as an Article 53 enforcement action?

This Note will argue that while all examples of economic coercion should not be considered enforcement actions, some type
of international regulation of economic sanctions that reach

such lethal proportions is warranted.
During the autumn of 1991, the Community proposed

numerous peace plans. Most republics signed, but the Serbs
refused and continued the prosecution of the war, killing

thousands. 6s The European Community recognized Croatia,
Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, with certain reservations,
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.64 It demanded
that a stringent set of requirements be met, or at least be
pledged to by the applicants, before granting recognition. rThese requirements surpassed those of regular international
law. However, despite the special requirements for recognition, the European Community never 66launched a peacekeeping operation into the Balkan region.
Keeping in mind the various experiences of the European
Community in attempting to address the Balkan War, the text
of Chapter VIII can be more fully analyzed.

60. Failure to Send Force to Yugoslavia Shows EC Immaturity, REuTR IUeR.
REP., Sept. 2, 1991, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Lbyrpt File.

61. Weller, supra note 43, at 575.
62. For a discussion of the E.C.'s debate regarding recognition of the
Balkan states, see generally Weller, supra note 43.
63. SERIs REJECrs EURoPEAN PEACE PLAN, supra note 59, at 5.
64. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinions on
Questions Arising from the Dissolution ofYugoslavia, January 11 andJuly 4,
1992, Opinions 4-7, 31 .LM. 1488; see also Weller, supra note 43, at 586-96.
65. Weller, supra note 43, at 588.
66. SeeJames B. Steinberg, InternationalInvolvement in the Yugoslav Conflict, in ENFORCING RERAiNT, supra note 26, at 27, 36-41. Moreover, the
debates within NATO during the late autumn of 1994 futher underscore the
potential difficulties of achieving political concensus within a regional organization. Se, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Britainand FranceCriticize U.S. on
BosniaPositions, N.Y. Tmms, Nov. 29, 1994, at A16.
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"As Appropriatefor Regional Action"

The Appropriateness Test

The appropriateness of regional action is based on a
"double yardstick" which examines "firstly... the existence of
a "local dispute' and secondly [sic] on the choice of peaceful
means to settle it (Art. 52(2))."67 Judging whether a conflict
can be qualified as "local" is simple. It must take place within
a discrete geographic area that is adjacent to or within the region in question. 68 We will turn to the more difficult issue of
69
means of settling disputes.
Aside from using the double yardstick, it is also useful to
envision the appropriateness test as a question ofjurisdiction.
One must ask if the conflict in question falls under purely domestic jurisdiction. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter prohibits
U.N. interference in domestic affairs. 70 If a situation falls
under this category and the United Nations does not have the
capacity to undertake an enforcement action, then it does not
have the jurisdiction to approve an enforcement action under67. Wolf, supra note 30, at 291.
68. Note how the E.C., and not the CSCE, became the primary decisionmaker in responding to the Balkan War although the Balkan republics are
not within the E.C., but adjacent to it.
69. Prior to considering enforcement actions themselves, one final "appropriateness" issue deserves consideration: whether regional organizations
may legally intervene in the affairs of a non member-state. "There is considerable support for the view that regional action under Article 52 is not appropriate in a matter involving a state not a party to the regional arrange-

ment."

HAMBRO ElT AL,

supra note 4, at 358.

Thus, ECOWAS easily overcame this legal hurdle since they were originally called in by a member state's government.
The European Community had a trickier procedural stance. While Yugoslavia had not been a member of the E.C., it had been a member of the
CSCE. All the members of the Community were members of the CSCE as
well. Each institution had what the other lacked: the CSCE lacked the "economic muscle and institutional authority to threaten economic sanctions,"
the E.G. had formidable sanction power; the E.C. lacked direct legal ties to
the Balkans, the CSCE provided a loose, albeit recognized set of political
agreements and norms. Weller, supra note 43, at 603.
Thus the E.C., acting under the legal aegis of the CSCE, provided the
economic power necessary to try to effect change.
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
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taken by a regional organization. Moreover, a regional organization cannot independently decide to undertake an enforcement action in the internal affairs of a state. Article 2(4) states
that "[all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."71
As a result, two types of regional organization activities
have been traditionally recognized as appropriate under the
U.N. Charter. the peaceful settlement of disputes and en72
forcement actions authorized by the Security Council.
2.

Civil Wars and DomesticJurisdiction

As already discussed, civil wars traditionally have been
considered issues of domestic jurisdiction outside the scope of
multilateral action. However, the recent increase in failed
states, as well as the overstretch of the United Nations, has
prompted scholars to begin questioning traditional constraints
on multilateral action.7"
The Balkan War is a case that forces such rethinking. The
European Community maintained that the break-up of Yugoslavia posed a threat to regional stability. 74 Initially, the Community perceived the break-up as a possible refutation of the
principle of territorial integrity. 75 Consequently, the European Community based its regional stability claims on the argument that it should attempt to limit the disintegration of a
country rather than to disregard the redraing of well settled
national boundaries. 76 However, three events occurred as the
war progressed: first, Germany became more forceful in its
defense of Croatia; 77 second, it became increasingly clear that
neither the European Community nor the United Nations had
the means to "rejoin" Yugoslavia; and, third, Serbian brutality
began -wiping cities and their populations off the map. The
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
Id. arts. 52, 53.
See genera!y Farer, supra note 38, at 319.
Weller, supra note 43 at 573; see also Steinberg, supra note 66, at 34.
Id. at 572.
Drozdiak, supra note 45.
MacFarlane & Weiss, supra note 53, at 27.
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logic for justifying intervention had to shift. Consequently, the
Community diplomats heard their call to action in the danger
of migrations and the possibility of a spillover in the fighting.
3.

AppropriatenessReconsidered: ECOWAS and The Liberian
Civil War

The recent intervention by the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) into the Liberian civil war provides a marked contrast to traditional views of appropriateness. 78 The Liberian case intertwines the legal issues of appropriateness and the justification of enforcement actions under
Chapter VIII with the Article 51 issue of collective self-defense. 79 In responding to the crisis in Liberia, an ECOWAS
member-state, ECOWAS undertook action that may have begun as a response to a plea for help, but which evolved into
enforcement action. In this case, the lack of an outcry by the
international community implied a shift of what is considered
to be appropriate regional organization intervention.
In 1980, Samuel Doe seized the reins of government in
Liberia by means of coup d'ietat. In July 1990, the roles were
reversed as Doe was embroiled in a three-way civil war against
Charles Taylor, one of his former ministers, and Prince Johnson, one of Taylor's former commanders. Of the three, Doe
welcomed ECOWAS's decision to intervene. 80
Two months earlier, in May 1990, ECOWAS had established the Standing Mediation Committee which, although
78. The following historical summary and discussion relies heavily on a
draft of Georg Nolte's article Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International
Aspects of the Liberian ConflicL Page numbers in citations referring to this
piece correspond to a draft of this article which is on file at the New York
University Journalof InternationalLaw and Politics.
79. This is akin to Nolte's argument that, "[bloth prevailing scholarly
opinion and state practice support the view that military action by third
states which is undertaken within a country upon the request of its lawful
government is not prohibited by Art. 2 (4) of the Charter." Id. at 20
80. There is some disagreement among commentators over whether Doe
requested intervention or whether ECOWAS decided to intervene and Doe
merely acquiesced. Georg Nolte argues the first while David Wippman, a
former counsel to the interim government of Liberia, seems to lean toward
the second: "President Doe, to the extent he retained any legal authority,
did welcome the decision to intervene." David Wippman, Enforcingthe Peace:
ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in ENFORCING R r.RmNT, supra note 26, at
157, 189; see also Nolte, supra note 78, at 4.
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given a mandate to find a "peaceful resolution" to "any conflict in the ECOWAS region," was constructed as a response to
the Liberian Civil War. 8 1 After meetings on August 6-7, 1990,
the Committee passed a four point resolution which stipulated:
1. There was to be an immediate cease-fire;
2. the ECOWAS cease-fire Monitoring Group,
ECOMOG, was established under the authority of the
Chairman of ECOWAS;
3. ECOMOG would supervise the implementation
and ensure strict compliance of the cease-fire;
4. an interim government would
be established as a
82
step to restoring democracy.
Although Doe and Johnson concluded a cease-fire, Taylor, who controlled most of the country, questioned the impartiality of ECOMOG and finally declared open hostility against
it83 ECOWAS responded by ordering ECOMOG "to oust Taylor's forces from Monrovia."8 4 Several weeks later, ECOMOG
controlled Monrovia.
ECOWAS's actions went beyond simple peacekeeping.
The organization not only sponsored discussions among the
warring factions, it played an integral part in the formation of
the new Liberian government. ECOWAS notified Doe, Taylor,
andJohnson that they would not be allowed to participate personally in the interim government, although their parties
could be represented.8 5 An anonymous ECOWAS official told
a reporter that although Taylor and Johnson could eventually
run for President, Doe's role in Liberia's political future would
be "[a]bsolutely none. The [peace] proposals are based on
[the] assumption that Doe would leave as soon as possible." 6
One month later, Johnson's men killed Samuel Doe was killed
byJohnson's men8 7 and a new round of fighting ensued until
81. Nolte, supra note 78, at 4.
82. lrr DAT-D 9 AUGUST, 1990 FRoM THE PERrANENr

REPREsNTATnE

op NiGERiA ro THE UNrTED NATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE SECREFAR'-GENERAL,

U.N. Doc. S/21485 (1990) (Annex), as quoted in Nolte, supra note 78, at 4-5.

83. Wippman, supra note 80, at 167.
84. Nolte, supra note 78, at 6-7.
85. Kenneth B. Noble, LiberiaLeader, Rejecting Truce Offer, Won't Quit, N.

Y. Tams, Aug. 21, 1990, at All.
86. Id.

87. Wippman, supranote 80, at 168.
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a cease-fire was signed in November.88 Along with ongoing negotiations for national reconciliation, the cease-fire lasted for
two years.89

The declaration that Doe could not be part of Liberia's
future cannot be easily reconciled with ECOWAS's consentbased justification for intervention. One may argue that inasmuch as Doe's party may continue participating in Liberia's
political life, ECOWAS did not really overstep its bounds. But
evidence points to the conclusion that ECOWAS unilaterally
decided to marginalize Doe in an interim government whose
structure ECOWAS itself designed. There is no doubt that
Doe, a strong-arm dictator, was not a sympathetic character
and that the situation probably called for the measures that
ECOWAS undertook. However, that is exactly the point:
ECOWAS's actions were determined by political realities, not
the niceties of the U.N. Charter.
ECOWAS did not seek prior approval for its intervention
from the United Nations nor was it told by that entity that it
had to end its intervention. Thus, in the Liberian scenario the
supposedly clear line of what was appropriate action for a regional organization to undertake became rather blurred.
4.

The Spectrum ofJustification

Could ECOWAS's action be justified as appropriate for a
regional organization? Since ECOWAS marginalized the Doe
government and forged a future for Liberia that did not envision Doe at all, the legitimacy of its action cannot be argued to
be based on the consent of the parties. Instead, one may analyze the Liberian case through the optic of Chapter VIII intervention. Although two treaties, the Protocol on Non Aggres88. Id. at 169 (citing the Joint Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities
and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict, Bamako, Mali, Nov. 28, 1990).
89. Starting inJuly 1992, the political situation once again devolved. Taylor was accused of not complying with various cease-fire regulations.
ECOWAS threatened to impose sanctions upon Taylor if he did not follow
the cease-fire agreement. Taylor attacked Monrovia on October 15, 1992,
precipitating economic sanctions, an arms embargo, and an armed offensive
by ECOMOG. Nolte, supra note 78, at 9. Taylor was driven from power in
April 1993.
Eventually, the Organization for African Unity became involved and
brokered a peace agreement. See Kenneth Noble, After 13 Years of a Vicious
War, LiberiansDare to Hopefor Peace, N.Y. TMS, Aug. 2, 1993, at A2.
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sion of April 22, 1978, and the Protocol Relating to Mutual
Assistance on Defense of May 21, 1981, establish defensive capabilities similar to those embodied in Article 51, neither provides for the right of intervention without state invitation.9 0
Consequently, justification for the resolutions of August 6 and
791 and their implementation would have to stem from a customary rule not embodied in these texts.
Some believe that intervention similar to the one taken in
Liberia is appropriate. For example, Georg Nolte lists three
major arguments for the appropriateness of intervention:
1. The imperative to avert a humanitarian disaster;,
2. the need to restore democracy;
3. the prevention of the destabilizing effects of refu92
gee flows.
Nolte further argues that each of these reasons is too imprecise to provide a strong legal basis for intervention.93 Uninvited intervention for humanitarian purposes, he argues, is
incompatible with Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. It is also
open to widespread abuse by states using "humanitarian" concerns as a pretext for invasion.9 4 The restoration of democracy may be taken simply as a backdoor entrance to humanitarian intervention and is fraught with all of its problems. Finally, refugee flows may threaten the peace, but they do not
wvarrant as a sufficient encroachment on state sovereignty. 95
While Nolte's criticisms are incisive, the shifting norms of customary international law may shore up the validity of these dis96
puted justifications.
In the case of humanitarian intervention, a determination
must be made of whether the potential for abuse denies a
right in customary international law. Particularly as a result of
the horrific spectacles of Croatia and Bosnia, there is an increasing sentiment in the world community that new risks in
the post-Cold War world may call for more interventionist policies. In light of the changing circumstances, former U.N. Un90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Nolte, supra note 78, at 11 nn.75 & 77.
i at 4-5.
I& at 15-19.
Id at 16.
Id. at 18; U.N. CHaRm art. 2, para. 4.
Nolte, supra note 78, at 17.
See infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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dersecretary of Political Affairs Brian Urquhart opened the
door to a possible re-interpretation of state obligations to the
U.N. Charter: "Until now [civil wars] have generally been considered as beyond the jurisdiction of international or regional
organizations .... In Yugoslavia the97 pattern of non-intervention has been cautiously put aside."
The above-noted critiques of this argument also apply to
Nolte's dismissal of intervention to save democracy. Besides
there being a strengthening consensus around the legality of
interventions into humanitarian disasters, there is also a
growth in the recognition of the democratic rights of individual citizens. 98 In particular, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights has been ratified by approximately
eighty-nine states,9 9 and it is taking on the mantle of customary international law applicable to all states, signatory or
not.' 00 While the entrance of democratic entitlement into customary international law would not in and of itself lead tojustifiable interventions for the sake of democracy, it provides an
indication as to what obligations the international community
may ask of a state.
While these justifications may be persuasive to varying degrees, one is nonetheless led to conclude that, based on the
black letter text of the U.N. Charter, ECOWAS's action was
not appropriate for a regional organization. Without Security
Council authorization, ECOWAS essentially undertook an unauthorized enforcement action.

97. Brian Urquhart, Who Can Stop Civil Wars, N. Y. TIMmEs, Dec. 29, 1991,
sec. 4, at 9. There are numerous volumes concerning humanitarian intervention. For a recent symposium of scholars and policymakers, see Humanitarian Intervention, HA.v. INTr'L REv., Fall 1993, at 8-32.
98. The OAS in particular points out that the democratic entitlement has
taken on the color of law in the Inter-American System. REPLY, supra note
40, at 12; see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
99. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171. The number of state parties is taken from BARRY E.
CARTER & PHILLIP RI TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw: SELECTED DOCUMENTS

357 (1991).
100. For an explanation of general state practice regarding custom, see
RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

sec. 102, cmt. b (1990).
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The ChangingMeans of Enforcement

1. Security Council and Enforcement Actions
Article 53 states that no enforcement action shall be undertaken without authorization by the Security Council,10 1 realizing Secretary of State Hull's view that regional organizations should be subordinate to the United Nations. However,
regional organizations have not been well integrated into the
U.N. system. At times they have carved out their own policies
regardless of whether or not they had the blessings of the
world organization. 10 2 The very existence of regional organizations was a hedge against the possible paralysis of the Security Council due to a permanent member's veto.103 As such,
regional organizations have been at times more responsive to
the needs of their members than to the stipulations of the
U.N. Charter.
a. State Practice
The E.G. response to the Balkans is indicative of the degree of initiative that a regional organization may take in response to international security issues. The E.C. did not act
against the wishes of the Security Council. On the contrary,
the E.C. acted when the Security Council chose not to get involved. 104 The economic sanctions against Haiti-first an
OAS embargo and then a U.N. blockade-is a similar case. In
both of these instances, the regional organizations provided
much needed stop-gap measures until the Security Council
was unified in an approach to the situation.
However, there has been at least one instance in which a
regional organization pursued an enforcement action without
formal U.N. approval. At the time of the ECOWAS intervention, "[n]ewspaper reports suggest[ed] that U.N. Secretary101. U.N. CaRTER art. 53, para. 1.
102. ECOWAS is an example of a regional organization undertaking military operations with neither the express approval of the United Nations nor

any promise that the Organization would itself intervene if ECOWAS became bogged down. The OAS and E.G. decisions to move fomard and address the Haitian and Balkan crises are two examples of regional organizations willing to involve themselves in civil conflict without any assurances

from the United Nations that it would consider the cases as well.
103. Bebr, supra note 18, at 167; Wippman, supra note 80, at 183.
104. See discussion supra part III.C.
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General Perez de Cuellar advised ECOWAS that no authorization by the Security Council was needed for its action, and
both the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United
States of America supported the decision." 10 5 Exactly why
ECOWAS did not need authorization is unclear; even if the
original action is portrayed as a response to a request made by
Doe, it is doubtful that ECOWAS stayed within the bounds of
the requested action.
b.

Cooperation and Independence

The Security Council maintains the power to define
which situations actually constitute threats to peace, but it has
been reluctant to do so in the case of civil wars. 106 Due partly
to this reluctance, some regional organizations are searching
for greater legal independence. The OAS, whose gestation
played such a large part in the formation of Chapter VIII,
wrote a particularly individualistic response to the SecretaryGeneral's Agenda.'0 7 Noting first that the American states had
developed international norms amongst themselves, such as
the defense of representative democracies, that were not yet
cemented in the global arena, the OAS stated that its "sphere
of action" was distinct from that of the United Nations.' 08 But
the analysis did not stop there. The response further concluded that "[t]he ties that bind OAS to the United Nations
are not based on hierarchical relations between the two organizations.'

09

Moreover, the OAS argued:
[c]ooperation implies by definition working with
others for a common purpose. O.A.S. could not be a
mere executor of decisions issuing from the United
Nations or any of its organs. Any attempt to establish
collaboration on the basis of prescriptions by one or105. Nolte, supra note 78, at 6.
106. The Chinese are particularly wary of any increase in U.N. involvement in domestic affairs.
107. See REPLY, supra note 40.

108. Id. at 12-13.
109. Id.at 13 (emphasis added). CompareU.N. CHATER art. 103 and Richard H. Lauwaars, InternationalLaw: The InterrelationshipBetween United Nations
Law and the Law of Other International Organizations, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1604,
1605-07 (1984) (comparing a heirarchichal text with a non-hierarchical interpretation).
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ganization to the other would vitiate the concept of

cooperation." 0
Implicitly, decisions which would need regional organization implementation should be made in concert with that regional organization. It is a call for policy coordination."'
The drafters of the OAS response make it clear that such
coordination should neither be in the form of U.N. supervision of regional organizations, nor should there be a division
of labor "on the basis of specialization." 1 2 They claim the first
option would not ease the load on the United Nations, but
rather would place greater demands on limited resources and
ultimately weaken the will to cooperate. The second option is
inappropriate because neither the United Nations nor regional organizations, such as the OAS, are specialized. These
113
organizations are general in nature.
Cooperation is especially necessary in the case of civil wars
because although the United Nations is noticeably reluctant to
intervene, and regional organizations are all but forbidden
from military actions according to traditional interpretations,
both recognize that such conflicts present a growing threat to
international security in the world today. The need for better
coordination during times of crises is merely an outgrowth of a
deeper problem: the lack of flexible and defined cooperation
procedures designed to prevent the outbreak of such crises.
2.

Economic Sanctions and the Circumvention of the Security
Council

When ECOWAS was faced with the possibility that the Security Council would not approve an enforcement action, it
simply chose to go forward and put the Council in the position
of having to tell it to stop. But what if a regional organization
is not prepared to test, or possibly even defy, the Security
Council? Similarly, what option is left for a regional organization that wishes to undertake an intervention but does not
have the means for a military excursion? An attractive answer
to both dilemmas is that rather than undertaking military action, the organization should enact economic sanctions. As
110. REPLY, supra note 40, at 13.
Id.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id

- 111.
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enumerated in Article 42, economic sanctions (as opposed to
a blockade which requires air, land and/or sea power) are not
traditionally considered an enforcement action open to Security Council regulation. 114 Thus, regional organizations may
opt to project their power not by the sword, but by the use of
sanctions.
a. E.C. Reactions to the Balkan War
This analysis can explain why the European Community
was able to use the economic and diplomatic measures that it
did in addressing Serbian aggression in the Balkans. However,
while this separation of Article 41 from Article 42 is understandable for political reasons (it is much more difficult to regulate economic force projection, which is ubiquitous in interstate relations, than it is to monitor military action 1 5 ), one
wonders if the distinction is truly satisfying. Recalling Delors's
rhetoric of "diplomatic... atomic bombs" and the very survival
of an economically cut-off Serbia," one may ask whether
these means are so much less intrusive than a military intervention.
b.

The OAS and Haiti

Turning one's gaze to Haiti, one sees an even more dramatic example of the potential lethality of economic coercion.
In the aftermath of the coup that exiled democratically elected
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the OAS recommended that
all of its member states "suspend their economic, financial,
and commercial ties with Haiti and any aid and technical cooperation except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes.""1 7 The OAS also requested from its members "action
114. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Regarding the interpretation of economic
sanctions in relation to the term enforcement action, see Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coersion in Contemporay InternationalLaw, 79 Am.J. INT'L L.
405, 406 (1985).
115. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The Security Council's Role in the Settlement of
InternationalDisputes, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 402 (1984).
116. Failure to Send Force to Yugoslavia Shows EC Immaturity, supra note 60.
117. LETTER DATED 3 OCTOBER 1991, FROM ECUADOR TRANSMrrrING TEXT
OF A RESOLUTION ON THE COUP D'ETAT IN HAm ACCORDED BY A MEETING OF

OAS FOREIGN MINISTERs, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/23109, quoted in Arend, supra
note 9, at 501 nn.59-60.
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to bring about the diplomatic
isolation of all those who hold
118
power illegally in Haiti."
Such a response was particularly telling for two reasons:
first, it facially contradicts Article 18 of the OAS Charter which
states:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force
but also any other form of interference or attempted
threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic, and cultural elements.1 1 9
Article 18 recognizes the fact that, although individual
states may choose to have or not have economic and diplomatic relations with another state, the concertedinterruption of
such activities by a large group of states-and in this case of a
country's major trading partners-calls into question a host of
issues not present in a single state's action. Such unified action leaves the target state the alternative of succumbing to the
organization's will or suffering the consequences. Thus, the
states drafting the OAS Charter were wary of such encroachments on state independence.
A second point of interest is that even prior to the addidon of a U.N. blockade nearly two years later, the economic
sanctions imposed by the OAS and like-minded members of
the United Nations had a devastating impact on the Haitian
120
economy.
3.

Economic Coercion and Enforcement Actions

The main response to the Article 18 objection is that economic sanctions were justifiable since the military junta that
had control of the country was not the legal government and
thus not subject to the protections that the OAS Charter af118. Id.
119. OAS CHATER, supra note 7, art. 18.
120. Howard W. French,Jobs Are at Risk in Haiti Sanctions, N.Y. Ttiv~s, Oct.

31, 1991, at A5; Howard W. French, Land and Health Also Erode in Haiti,N.Y.
Tams,Jan. 28, 1992, atA3; Howard IV.French, Sanctions Said to Ful Haitian
Exodus by Sea, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1991, at 1. For a criticism of the effectiveness of the sanctions on Haiti, see FightHaiti'sThugs with Oil, N.Y. T.f s, May
19, 1992, at A22.
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fords rightful governments. This answer can be compounded
with Professor Thomas Farer's analysis that "[a]s a legal proposition, [Article 18] is perfectly empty; for if read literally, it
would outlaw diplomacy." 2 1 Professor Farer continues: "The
international community clearly believes that many tactics for
making states behave in ways they would prefer not to behave
are well within the realm of its law ....[T]he word "coercion'
has no normative significance; there is nothing illegal about
122
coercion."
Moreover, the U.N. Charter was not meant to outlaw economic coercion. Its purpose was quite simply to "outlaw war as
an instrument of state policy or self-help .... [SI ome efforts
by small states to introduce the concept of economic coercion
into the Charter at the very outset ... were categorically de23

feated."'1
But one is left with the problem that, although the use of
economic measures cannot be controlled by the Security
Council, they still have a devastating impact in today's world.
While interdependence makes coercive economic measures
difficult to regulate, it also makes them particularly lethal.
Thus, while economic sanctions may not be defined as an "enforcement action," they may nonetheless place severe pressure
1 24
on the target country.

121. Farer, supra note 114, at 406.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 410.
124. Professor Farer recognizes this and notes that there may be some
rare instances in which economic coercion may violate international law; but
the burden of proof would be heavy and lie on the complaining state. Id. at
411. Professor Farer further states that he "would be willing to go no further
than treating economic coercion as aggression when, and only when, the
objective of the coercion is to liquidate an existing state or to reduce that
state to the position of a satellite." Id. at 413. Such aggression is not the issue
in the cases being considered here. It is obvious that the OAS and the E.C.
were attempting to defend human rights and deter aggressors. However,
while their goals were not to liquidate an existing state, the effects or expected effects (remember Delors) of their actions would have been indistinguishable from those that Professor Farer views as beyond the pale. The task
at hand, then, is to reconcile the basic texts of international law with the
realities of today's state practice.
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C. Information of Activities Undertaken or in Contemplation
Another topic in need of such attention is the issue of
Security Council authorization for enforcement actions undertaken by regional organizations. Article 54 sets forth an obligation of regional organizations to keep the Security Council
"at all times... fully informed of activities undertaken or in
contemplation... for the maintenance of international peace
and security."'1 The above discussion underscores why this article is of vital importance, now more than ever.
D.

Textual Conclusions

Based on the preceding discussion, one may draw the following conclusions:
1. Regional organizations may define their membership
and the scope of their functions. There has been a pendulum
swing from wanting to be identified only with Article 51 self
defense procedures, to a growing interest in Chapter VIII's en1 26
forcement action dimensions.
2. Traditionally, civil wars were beyond the scope of appropriate regional organization action. However, the threats
of mass migrations, spillover fighting, and extensive human
rights violations have given the Security Council an opening to
enter into the domestic affairs of states. While regional organizations seem to believe that this opening should also be
large enough for them to enter into the domestic arena, as yet
there are no conclusive decisions by the Security Council or
the International Court of Justice to give weight to this argumenL

127

3. The term "enforcement action" does not have a conclusive definition. Whether or not economic coercion is an
enforcement action presents a troubling dilemma. If it is an
enforcement action, then the Charter in its current form outlaws the use of a common diplomatic tool absent Security
Council ratification. On the other hand, if economic coercion
is not an enforcement action, then the United Nations is ignoring one of the most destructive means of power projection.
As these economic practices are embedded in the very concep125. U.N. CHAm art. 54.
126. See discussion supra part H.C.
127. See discussion supra parts II.B, IV.A.
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tion of modem diplomacy, it is unlikely that state practice will
need to change in
change. The text of the Charter may itself128
order to maintain vitality in today's world.
4. According to Article 53, authorization is needed for an
enforcement action. Since the majority of coercive techniques
by regional organizations are economic in nature, this clause is
not often cited. However, as the Liberian case illustrates, regional organizations have been able to take military action
without Security Council consent. The legal justification for
intervention was never articulated well, although its political
necessity was clear. Analysts cite Article 51 as a method of au129
thorization.
5. There is a Charter-based obligation to keeping the
United Nations well informed.' 3 0
How should we read the text? Instead of simply changing
the meanings of the words to fit state practice, a habit which
could lead to the same words meaning very different things in
different articles, one should observe state practice and ask if
the text is still relevant to the trends of state practice. One
therefore needs to examine certain pragmatic considerations
of regional organization action and incorporate these insights
into the text.
V.

THE SEEDS OF A NEW SYSTEM?

In considering the possibilities for the future of regional
organization/U.N. relations, certain political factors need to
be further analyzed in light of the preceding discussion of the
Charter text: the dangers of institutional deadlock and the
various (non-U.N. Charter) constraints on regional organizations. These issues may in turn be the seeds from which a revitalized Chapter VIII may grow.
A.

Article 51 and InstitutionalDeadlock

The fear of a politically paralyzed Security Council, which
fueled the drafting of Article 51, also explains why regional
organizations in the Cold War era attempted to define themselves by Article 51 as opposed to Chapter VIII. The flexibility
128. See discussion supraparts II.B, IV.B.
129. See discussion supra part 1V.A.3.
130. See discussion supra part IV.C.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1994]

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

829

afforded by this self-defense provision gave a sense of security
that did not exist when a state or organization had to worry
about an ideologically split Council.
However, the threat of deadlock still exists in attempts to
resolve civil wars. In the Balkan, Haitian, and Liberian cases
the Council showed an aversion to entering conflict.
Although the OAS simply used sanctions, ECOWAS fielded an
expeditionary force which was later justified by Article 51.
Due to the above objections to Article 51 justification, Liberia may prove to be an instance of the Security Council allowing by tacit approval the prosecution of an enforcement
action by a regional organization. Due in part to the burdens
faced by the United Nations and to the uncertain propect of
passing a Chapter VII or VIII measure in the Security Council,
there were no attempts to stop ECOWAS. The United Nadons, in effect, deferred to the regional organization. Such a
reaction is telling for the possibilities of methods to avert future deadlock. However, it leaves many questions as to the
competence of regional organizations in attempting enforcement actions.
B. Constraintson Regional Organizations
1. The Charters of the Regional Organizations
Many regional organizations may not have the legal foundations which would allow military interventions into member
states involved in civil wars. 13 ' In its reply to the Agenda, the
OAS stated:
There is no provision in the [OAS] Charter to authorize the organization to use force in any situation
but the exceptional one of external aggression.
Apart from that exception, therefore, the use of force
has no legitimacy in the legal framework that governs
the relations among the American States.. .The best
way to update instruments and mechanisms in response to the changing international reality is to
131. For OAU and ECOWAS documents, see supra note 49. See also Conference on Security and Co-operati )n in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New
Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions
of the Charter, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.LM. 190 (1991); Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe: Declaration and Decisions from Helsinki Summit, July 10, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1385 (1992).
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modernize their charters by known and accepted
procedures. The technique of creative interpretation
of provisions is neither effective nor advisable ....
Any decision taken to impose on a regional organization the adoption of coercive measures not authorized in its own basic instruments could bring into crisis the operation and the very existence of that organ32
ization.'
By the OAS's logic, for an enforcement action to be legal,
it must not only pass the Chapter VIII test, it must also be legal
by the charter of the regional organization.
Now, more than ever, regional organizations are exploring the possibilities of Chapter VIII responsibilities.1 3 3 However, these aspirations should be codified so as to provide a
clear guide for future generations as to the rights and responsibilities of these organizations in relation to the United Nations. It would be a step toward ending all the confusion surrounding which actions are allowable and which are not.
2.

Implementation Problems

a. Militay and Financial Capabilities
As a starting point, one should recognize the operational
constraints of regional organizations. Many do not have the
ability to field armed forces.13 4 Considering the prolonged
and complex operations that could be necessary to resolve a
civil war, the only hope many regional organizations may have
of undertaking such an enforcement action is through U.N.
subsidy.
132. REPLY, supra note 40, at 14.
133. See id.; see also G.A. Res. A/Res/46/13, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991) (exhibiting the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference);
G.A. Res. a/Res/46/20, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. 49, at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/46/49 (1991) (exhibiting the cooperation between the United Nations
and the Organization of African Unity); GA Res. A/Res/46/24, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991) (exhibiting the cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab
States).
134. This could be due to any of a number of reasons, such as a lack of
financial resources, a lack of experience in conducting coordinated military
operations, or a charter provision that prohibits military excursions into
member states.
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The Role of Hegemony

In the past, the Security Council acted as a defense
against regional hegemony. States could seek Security Council
involvement "particularly where the possibility exists that a
powerful5 state uses a regional agency for coercing a smaller
8
state."'
Today, given the attempts at burden sharing, the Security
Council may find it wise to harness the abilities of regional
hegemons. In the Liberian scenario, ECOWAS' decisive acdon was largely led by Nigeria. By contrast, the E.C. faced debates between three of its central members: Britain, France,
and Germany. The first case was an example of leadership
and significant intervention, the second of indecision. The
E.C., one of the world's most economically and politically powerful organizations, was taunted by Serb gunmen. The promise of hegemony is the benefit of leadership: speed, flexibility,
and oversight. Its peril is the risk of bias and abuse. 3 6
C. Necessity and Invention
Given these interconnected issues, what are the possibilities of a renovation of the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations?
1. The Need for a Flexible Relationship
Assuming that a regional organization plans and has the
ability to undertake an enforcement action, there may be instances in which the Security Council would prefer that the
regional organization not become involved. One obvious case
is that of predatory hegemony, in which a regional organization is essentially controlled by one or two states which may be
merely using civil conflict as a pretext to invade. Another
ex37
ample would be the fear of exacerbating a conflict.I
135. HAMBRO E-r AI.., supranote 4, at 357 n.13 (refering to the Punta del
Este debates).
136. See, e.g., Suzanne Crow, Russia Promotes the CIS As An InternationalOrganization, Radio Free Europe Research Report, (Mar. 18, 1994) 1-6
(describing how Russia's attempts to have the world community accept the
Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.) as a regional organization
factors into Russia's attempts at regional influence).
137. Hans Kelsen mentioned the risk of two regional organizations each
claiming an Article 51 self defense and going to war with one another. Hans
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At the same time, the United Nations should give leeway
to the rapid reactions that are sometimes necessary to prevent
a bloodbath. Although it would be difficult to portray as an
Article 51 measure, a NATO or E.G. intervention without Security Council approval in the early days of the Balkan crisis
would probably have been perceived as essentially conforming
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Nonetheless, the strict tone of Article 53 would prevent such an enforcement action without the approval of the Security Council.
What if one or more members causes deadlock? A mechanism
which would allow rapid responses to take place, but still act as
a check against abuses, is necessary.
2. A New Chapter VII
Based upon these observations, policymakers are
presented with three main courses of action. One may choose
to ignore the divergences between the theory and practice of
Chapter VIII and interpret the Charter as an internally consistent text. Thus, state practice is disregarded and one simply
waits for states to conform to textual legal norms. A second
possibility would be to change how one interprets the words of
Chapter VIII so that they better conform to state practice.
This is the idea of a "living" or "evolving" text.13 8 Finally, one
may change the Charter itself so that a new text, which explicitly takes into account modem state practice is written.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Note concludes that since Chapter VIII was written
prior to the formation of most of today's regional organizations, and could not take into account the changes that both
strengthened and weakened regional action, a new Chapter
VIII should be drafted to respond to the evolution of politics
and custom since World War 11.139 The basic question raised
Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self Defense Under the Charterof the United
Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 795 (1948).
138. There is a particularly rich tradition in American Constitutional interpretation of analyzing the Constitution as a document that changes with
the times. See Justice Cardozo's concurrence to Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
139. Recently, the Russian Federation proposed to the Special Committee
of the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role
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throughout this Note has been whether the relative successes
of regional organizations have been due to the regulations of
Chapter VIII, or in spite of them. In the cases of ECOWAS's
unauthorized enforcement actions, and the Security Council
deadlock over the Balkans, regional organizations have either
acted or planned to act despite what the letter of the Charter
says. On the other hand, the Charter has also proven to be
underinclusive in its scope by not addressing the issue of lethal
economic coercion. Vacillating between being too restrictive
or not restrictive enough in dealing with regional organizations, the U.N. Charter is in need of repair. If one simply ignores state practice and devises legal doctrine, that doctrine is
sure to fail when applied in the real world. If one starts redefining words and clauses in the Charter, then the Charter may
begin to appear as a castle built on sand, subject to interpretive gusts from one direction, then the other. But if one
openly recognizes the disparity between theory and practice
and chooses to take the extraordinary measure of rewriting
the Charter, an even less frequent decision than the amendment the U.S. Constitution, the importance of the situation
would be stressed and the legitimacy of the new text would be
much greater.
It is not the goal of this Note to provide such a reformulation. However, for the sake of providing an example, the following possible revision is proposed:
A new Chapter VIII could be changed with the goals of
increasing the flow of information between the regional and
global organizations, allowing not only an increased flexibility
for regional organizations to undertake enforcement actions,
but also allowing greater U.N. regulation of regional organization policies-be they traditional enforcement actions or
not-that reach a certain level of lethality.
In this schema, regional organizations would be responsible for monitoring their regions for issues regarding international peace and security and giving regular reports to the Seof the Organization a draft declaration concerning regional organizations,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L72/Rev.1. For a discussion of this draft proposal, see
U.N. GAOR Special Comm., 48th Sess., Supp. No. 33, U.N. Doc. A/48/33
(1993). I am indebted to Dr. Kening Zhang for bringing the Russian draft to
my attention.
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curity Council. 140 An overlap of coverage by organizations
may occur, but with a clear organizational structure, this is of
no great concern. 14 1 Rather, subregional organizations would
be encouraged to coordinate reporting responsibilities with
broader organizations from their regions. For instance,
ECOWAS and other smaller regional organizations may provide reports to the Organization of African Unity, which would
collate and present the data, with due credit, to the Security
Council.
Regional organizations would be charged with notifying
the Security Council of any potential conflicts within the region so that any necessary coordination may take place between the Security Council and that organization. If a regional organization intends to undertake an enforcement action, it must notify the Security Council of its intentions. Once
notified, the Security Council may veto any such enforcement
action by a majority of the sitting members. Although the Security Council may not have vetoed a particular enforcement
action, the regional organization may not assume that it would
receive any U.N. subsidization unless it requests such aid and
the request is approved by the normal channels.
Such a mechanism would allow regional organizations a
certain freedom in pursuing their agendas. However, if it becomes clear that any of their actions do not meet the basic
requirement of consistency with the purposes and principles
of the United Nations, the United Nations may veto the action.
By this reasoning, the Security Council could veto economic
sanctions that are unjustly intended to cripple their targets.
As with the current system, there remains the problem of
enforcement: a regional organization may ignore a veto of its
intervention into a civil war. However, such a policy may not
only distance that organization's member-states from the
United Nations, the organization could risk being labeled as
140. A similar proposal was made by Louis B. Sohn, supra note 115, at 402,
404. However, he constructed a system of monitoring groups that would report to the Security Council and consult with regional organization.

141. At the moment, overlap is a concern among the various supranational institutions in Europe (E.C., CSCE, WEU, NATO, etc.). However, this

is not so much a dilemma of overlap, as it is an example of each institution
searching for a new identity for itself and in relation to the other organizations.
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an aggressor by the Security Council, which could lead to international sanctions or Article 51 operations.
There may well be other problems with this proposal,
some readily apparent, others that can be found only through
actual practice. Nonetheless, the shortcomings of the current
system are well-known. The text of Chapter VIII has become
separated from state practice. Given the changes taking place
in the world, the specter of divorce is not out of the question.
However, for a reconciliation to occur, theory and practice will
have to change somewhat, and state practice is notoriously
stubborn.
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